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Abstract 
While customary land tenure systems are still prevalent in most African countries, they are 
believed to be evolving to private land ownership. However, questions about how they are 
evolving and what determines this evolution remain un-answered. This study contributes to 
the literature by empirically analyzing the process of the evolution of land tenure systems in 
Uganda using community-, household-, and parcel-level data. By tracing rural-to-rural 
migration patterns, we found that immigrant-dominated and ethnically diverse communities 
have a higher incidence of private land ownership. As an implication of the evolution of 
land tenure system, we found that land markets are more active in immigrant communities, 
which enhances efficiency in land allocation through land transactions. In fact, we found a 
large and significant inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in 
communities with communal land ownership, and an insignificant relationship in 
communities with more privately owned land. These findings suggest that rural-to-rural 
migration, through weakening traditional social systems, promotes the shift from communal 
to individual land ownership which, in turn, boosts land transactions and efficient land use. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large and growing body of literature on the role of private land rights and 
land tenure security in stimulating agricultural development and hence improving the 
wellbeing of landholders in developing countries (Feder & Feeny, 1991; Besley, 1995; 
Otsuka & Place, 2001; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Fenske, 2011; Bellemare, 2013). It is 
believed that private land ownership and tenure security facilitate transactions in land rental 
and sales markets by reducing transaction costs, stimulate land investment by securing 
investment returns, and improve credit access as land can be used as collateral (Brasselle, 
Gaspart, & Platteau, 2002; Otsuka & Place, 2013; Holden & Otsuka, 2014). However, 
customary land tenure systems, characterized by communal or collective land ownership as 
opposed to private land ownership, are still prevalent in Africa (Migot-Adholla, et al., 
1991; Otsuka & Place, 2001; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Fenske, 2011).  There is, thus, a 
concern that the current communal land institutions discourage efficient land use, 
investment in land and productivity growth. 
The existing studies argue that land tenure institutions endogenously evolve towards 
individual land ownership in response to population pressure and economic dynamics. For 
instance, the theory of induced institutional innovation contends that population pressure, 
through altering relative factor scarcities, promotes institutional changes toward secure 
private property rights institutions (Hayami & Ruttan, 1985; Lin, 1989; Feder and Feeny, 
1991). These studies are in line with Boserupian theory of agriculture intensification which 
argues that population growth leads to the adoption of labor-intensive farming systems to 
enhance land productivity (Boserup, 1965). Since the adoption of new farming systems 
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requires land investments such as terracing, irrigation and tree planting, secure land rights 
must be established. Thus, the evolution theory of land rights (ETLR) stipulates that 
population pressure in Africa leads to evolution of land rights towards secure individualized 
land ownership (Ault & Rutman, 1979; Atwood, 1990; Place & Hazell, 1993; Platteau, 
1996, Otsuka & Place, 2001).  
However, our empirical knowledge about the process of evolution of land 
institutions in Africa is exceedingly scant. Descriptive studies suggest that the incidence of 
individual land ownership is high in communities with many immigrants in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991). This may be relevant in Africa because migration 
across rural communities appears to have increased recently following the rapid population 
explosion.
4
 Since migration leads to changes in the population density and ethnic 
composition in host communities, it may affect the costs and benefits of maintaining 
traditional communal land ownership systems or establishing private land ownership 
systems and hence cause a change in land tenure arrangements.  
Customary land in Africa is administered based on traditional land arrangements 
that discourage the functioning of land rental and sales markets, while focusing on 
preserving cultural identity. Indeed, many studies in Africa have observed that indigenous 
inhabitants oppose to sales of land to “strangers” for fear that clan lands will go to hands of 
immigrants (Plateau, 1996; Fred-Mensah, 1999; Donge & Pherani, 1999). These traditional 
practices and attachments to land are strongly established in traditional communities where 
                                                          
4
 Due to initial un-equal distribution of land across communities, rural-rural migration increased following 
population explosion in recent decades. The population growth in the region is 2.53% higher than the world 
average of 2.1%. 
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inhabitants share the same ethnic identity, cultural norms, and practices. Through migration 
process, however, these traditional institutions may be weakened in host communities. We 
hypothesize that since migration and ethnic diversity weaken traditional customary 
institutions, land tenure systems have evolved from communal to private ownership in 
immigrant communities. We also hypothesize that high population density increases land 
scarcity, hence, raises social cost of communally owning land, and, consequently, induces 
the demand for private land rights. Lastly, we postulate that migrations and population 
density stimulates land rental and sales markets that in turn enhances production efficiency. 
This study explores the evolution of land tenure systems with a particular focus on 
rural-to-rural migration, ethnic diversity and population density. First of all, we explore if 
there is a higher incidence of private land ownership in ethnically diverse communities with 
many immigrants than homogenous communities with fewer immigrants. Second, we 
examine whether households in densely populated communities are more likely to own land 
privately than those in sparsely populated communities. Third, we inquire what the 
implication of changes in land tenure arrangements is on land transactions and agriculture 
performance.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the land tenure institutions in Uganda. Section 3 discusses the data and the descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents a conceptual framework on how rural-rural migration 
influences changes in land ownership status and presents hypotheses. Section 5 outlines our 
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empirical strategy. Econometric results are presented and discussed in section 6 and section 
7 concludes. 
2. Land in Ugandan Context 
2.1.  Agriculture, land tenure systems and migration in rural Uganda 
As in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agricultural land is an essential 
pillar of human development and economic growth in Uganda since agriculture is the 
‘backbone’ of the economy. Agriculture employs 73% of the working population and 
contributes to 24% of gross domestic product in Uganda (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). 
However, communal land ownership and tenure insecurity amidst dwindling agriculture 
performance have raised concern over rising food insecurity and increasing poverty 
incidence.
5
  Given an increasingly land scarcity due to the country’s high population 
growth rate, current traditional farming system needs to be transformed to more intensive 
system.
6
  We hypothesize that individual land ownership and tenure security would be the 
key driver for the institutional transformation as they are expected to give higher incentives 
to invest in land improvement and to facilitate more efficient land allocation through land 
transactions in the rental and sales markets. 
Land is owned by the citizens in Uganda who can choose how to manage their land 
either individually or communally in accordance with customary norms and practices. This 
is unlike some other SSA countries where land is owned by the government and individuals 
                                                          
5
 The yield of major cereals in Uganda  have been declining  since the early 1990s thereby raising threats of  
food insecurity (Pender et al., 2004) 
6
 The annual population growth rate is 3.2 percent in 2012, which is the second highest in the world (World 
Bank, 2012). 
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are only granted use rights.
 7
 There are four legally recognized land tenure systems in 
Uganda; freehold, leasehold, customary and Mailo.
8
 Customary system is the dominant 
land tenure arrangement under which individuals’ use of land is subject to regulations and 
sanctions determined by the community, clan or family specific norms and practices. Prior 
to the Buganda agreement of 1900, customary land tenure arrangement was the only land 
tenure arrangement in Uganda and it involved communal land ownership where the village 
chief or king’s agents were in charge of allocating and administering land use among 
community members. Land use norms and practices varied by ethnicity and society but one 
common characteristic was that land was owned communally (West, 1965; Lastarria 
Cornhiel, 2003). Community members in customary land areas were regarded as tenants at 
sufferance who only had use rights and land access was by descent clan membership, 
holding political position or both (West, 1965).  
Corresponding to high population growth and increasing land scarcity, residents 
started out-migration from regions and communities with high population density. Land 
transactions, as a new mode of land acquisition, increased as emigrants wanted to sell off 
their occupied land before migrating and to purchase land from large land-owners in 
                                                          
7
 The land reform of 1975 in Uganda had put land in hands of government as stipulated by 1975 land decree 
where people would only acquire use rights through land leases. This directive was however never 
implemented as the country was in turmoil with successive wars. The 1995 constitution reversed the 
stipulations of land decree and put land in hands of the citizens again. 
8
 Mailo tenure arrangement was introduced by colonialists. Under 1900 Buganda agreement, 19,600 square 
miles of land was divided into mile blocks (hence Mailo) and given to chiefs and other officials with their 
titles in Buganda kingdom (West, 1965; Rugadya, 1999). Former peasants who were cultivating the land 
never got a share and instead became tenants, obliged to pay rent to title holders. We drop parcels under this 
externally imposed tenure regime in our analysis since this tenure arrangement is not flexible and has not 
evolved over time. 
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destination areas. Indeed, Baland et al. (2007) provide evidence that land transactions have 
been increasing in Uganda. Moreover, customary tenure has been evolving towards private 
land ownership where individuals can transfer and decide on land use practices without 
seeking consent from clan heads. Currently, customary tenure can be categorized into 
communal and individual customary tenure (Busingye, 2002). Private customary 
arrangement is more efficiency-oriented than communal ownership because it facilitates 
land investment, land transactions and, where financial institutions, such as micro-finance 
institutions and Saving and Credit Co-operatives (SACCO), allow untitled land as collateral, 
use of land for credit access. Communal tenure system is concentrated in northern and far 
eastern Uganda, while private customary is more common in near eastern and western 
regions of Uganda. The persistence of communal customary land arrangements in the north 
can be explained by high level of insecurity due to internal wars in the region. While 
resettlement programs are on-going, large chunks of communal lands are still un-occupied. 
Other existing tenure systems, though on a very small scale, are leasehold and 
freehold. Leasehold grants leasehold title and full ownership rights such as use rights, 
transfer rights and the right to bequeath over the tenure of the lease; usually 49 and 99 years. 
Land is held in perpetuity and the owner is issued with a title under freehold tenure. A very 
small proportion of land in Uganda belongs to either freehold or leasehold, so this study 
does not pay attention to these land tenure systems.  
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3. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
3.1. Data 
We use community-, household-, and parcel-level data collected as part of the 
Research on Poverty, Environment, and Agricultural Technology (RePEAT) panel studies 
from rural Uganda, and the latest round of RePEAT survey was conducted in 2012/2013.
9
 
The RePEAT survey covers 29 districts and 94 Local Council ones (LC1s), which are the 
smallest administrative units in Uganda.
10
  From each LC1, 10 households were selected to 
make a total of 940 sample households (Yamano et al., 2004). The RePEAT surveys were 
jointly conducted by Makerere University, the Foundation for Advanced Studies on 
International Development (FASID), and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
(GRIPS) in 2003, 2005, 2009, and by Makerere University and GRIPS in 2012/2013.  
In the RePEAT survey, community-level interviews were conducted along with the 
household surveys. In the household surveys, information was solicited on basic household 
composition and demographics, ethnicity, wealth, and economic activities. Parcel-level 
information was also collected on land tenure systems, acquisition mode, land use, and 
inputs and outputs of crop production for the two seasons (e.g., the second cropping season 
in 2011 and the first cropping season in 2012). The community survey elicited information 
on the migration history of the community inhabitants for two generations (current and the 
                                                          
9 
The sample for the RePEAT survey builds upon and complements a completed research project on policies 
for improved land management in Uganda, conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and Makerere University from 1999 to 2001 (Pender et al., 2004). The latter involved a survey of 107 
Local Council ones (LC1s), selected from two-thirds of the regions in Uganda, including the more densely 
populated areas and areas that were free from wars in the southwest, central, east, and parts of northern 
Uganda and representing seven of the nine major farming systems of the country. Because of insecurity in the 
north and northeastern parts of the country, LC1s in this region were excluded from the surveyed samples. 
10
 We use “LC1”, “village”, or “community” interchangeably.  
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parents’ generation), the number of tribes in the community and the quality of roads to 
district headquarters as a measure of market access.  
3.2. Community Categorization 
For the exposition, we classify our study communities into “receiving” and “sending” 
communities based on the community survey where we solicited information on the 
proportion of households that immigrated. This was done for both current generation and 
parents’ generation. Particularly, we asked the following questions: (i) out of the total 
households in this village (current generation), how many were not born here (or 
immigrated)?; (ii) out of those who were born in the village, how many of their parents 
(second generation) were not born in this village? A community is defined as “receiving” if 
at least 30% of the households from both generations immigrated, and it is defined as 
“sending” if there were emigrations but less than 30% immigrant households for both 
current and parents’ generations. We considered two generations because migration 
induced by land scarcity is a recent phenomenon in Uganda: at least from our focus group 
interviews and available historical studies, noticeable within-country migrations started in 
late 1946 in the form of kingdom resettlement arrangements (Ngologoza, 1998). We set the 
threshold at 30% because immigrations from neighboring villages sometimes happen and 
these can set the number of immigrant households above zero, yet such migrations do not 
affect land tenure arrangements as customary land arrangements cut across neighboring 
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communities
11
. Also, if immigrants are very few, they remain the minority and thus do not 
influence the functioning of village-specific land arrangements, even if those immigrants 
are of a different ethnicity.  
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the distribution of land tenure systems in Uganda from 2003 to 
2012 using the RePEAT data set. The proportion of land under private ownership increased 
from 40% in 2003 to 46% in 2005 and further to 56% in 2012. Conversely, land under 
communal ownership declined from 46% to 35% and to 25% during the same periods. 
There are no systematic changes in other tenure regimes over the same period. However, 
the number of parcels operated by the household increased from 2.5 to 3.8 between 2003 
and 2012, which suggests that land scarcity induces land fragmentation.  
Table 2 presents community characteristics using the RePEAT data sets. There are 
higher proportions of both current and parents’ generation immigrant households in 
receiving than in sending communities. In receiving communities, 52% of the current-
generation and 41% of the parents’-generation households immigrated. In the sending 
communities, the proportion of current and parents’-generation households that immigrated 
is 10% and 8%, respectively. The population density is higher in sending communities (5.3 
persons per hectare) than in receiving communities (4.6 persons per hectare). This suggests 
that land is scarcer in sending than in receiving communities.  
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 A community in our study is a village that comprises the smallest unit of administration in Uganda. Some 
clans can occupy more than one village and, in many cases, land arrangements can cover many villages to a 
level of a parish, the second level of administration from a village. 
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In Table 3, we present basic characteristics of sample parcels and households. The 
yield is almost the same between sending and receiving communities. The distance to the 
parcels is longer in sending (19 minutes) than in receiving communities (15 minutes). This 
is presumably because land scarcity makes households operate on plots far from the 
homestead in sending communities. Indeed, the land size is smaller (2 ha) and the number 
of operated parcels larger (4.9 parcels/household) in sending communities than in receiving 
communities (3 ha and 3.3 parcels/household, respectively).  The proportion of privately-
owned land is higher in receiving communities, while that under communal ownership is 
higher in sending communities. In receiving communities, 70% of the parcels are privately 
owned and 23% are communally owned. On the other hand, in sending communities, the 
proportion of privately owned land is lower and that of communally owned land is higher 
than in receiving communities. The main mode of land acquisition in sending communities 
is inheritance, while it is purchasing in receiving communities. Land renting in receiving 
community is twice as common as in sending community. At the household level, 85% of 
households in sending communities are indigenous or native which is significantly higher 
than 60% in receiving communities.  
4.  Conceptual framework 
In this section we present a conceptual framework which will shape our hypotheses. 
We describe how land tenure arrangements evolve in response to high population density 
and rural-to-rural migration.  
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4.1. Population density, migration, and the evolution of land institutions 
In this framework we examine how increasing population density and rural-to-rural 
migration lead to the changes in customary land institutions from communal towards 
private land ownership. While the existing studies have theorized that population growth 
induces changes in land tenure arrangements (Hayami & Ruttan, 1985), the role of internal 
migration is ignored. These factors, population growth and internal migration, are closely 
linked, because population pressure leads to land scarcity and consequently causes out-
migration to areas with low population density and available land, especially if population 
was un-equally distributed across communities. However, migration can also be influenced 
by other factors such as natural disasters, conflicts and government resettlement programs.   
In customary land tenure arrangements, the powers to administer and allocate land, 
and resolve conflicts are vested in the hands of the community heads; in African setting 
these are Kings, chiefs and elders. Individuals have use rights, and the main mode of land 
acquisition is through inheritance and allocation among family members which is 
conditional on being a member of the community by descent (West 1965). At the initial 
stages of the evolution, communities are homogenous in terms of ethnic composition and 
are closely knit. Moreover, land is abundant, and the expansion of crop land is through 
clearing forests and other uncultivated land. These characteristics are well documented for 
most agrarian societies by Boserup (1965). As population increases land gets scarce and 
land value appreciates. The social cost resulting from the communal land tenure system 
which does not allow for market transactions increases with increasing land scarcity. Also, 
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when there is no more unutilized land, the need to adopt land-saving technologies and to 
increase agriculture investment renders communal land ownership inappropriate. People 
would respond to such situation by demanding for individualized land rights so as to be 
able to secure investment returns accrued to new farming systems.  
The cost of maintaining communal land ownership is higher when communities are 
ethnically diverse because it is complex to harmonize different tribes’ institutional 
arrangements in a communal setting. Rural-to-rural migration, in addition to increasing 
population density in the host communities, leads to the mixing of tribes, clans and families 
from various backgrounds. This diversity in host communities weakens or sometimes leads 
to the breakdown of pre-existing informal land arrangements. In addition, inter-community 
migration increases land transactions since immigrants have to purchase or rent in land 
from the land owners. It is, therefore, likely that land tenure arrangements in host 
communities are likely to evolve towards land ownership faster than those in non-migrant 
communities.   
4.2. Testable hypotheses  
We postulate the following main hypotheses based on the conceptual framework; 
Hypothesis 1: Ethnically diverse communities with a higher proportion of immigrants have 
a higher incidence of privately-owned land than those homogenous communities with 
fewer in-migrants.  
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Hypothesis 2: At the household level, parcels operated by immigrants have a higher 
likelihood of being privately owned than similar parcels operated by native or indigenous 
households.  
Hypothesis 3: There are more privately-owned parcels in densely-populated communities 
than in their sparsely-populated counterparts. 
Private land ownership is expected to activate land transactions through reducing 
transaction costs. Land transactions in turn equalize factor proportions among farming 
households which promotes efficiency in land use and production. In addition, when land 
markets are functioning, the land-poor households acquire land from the land-abundant 
households through purchase or renting, which promotes equity (Baland et al., 2007; 
Songqing & Jayne, 2013). Therefore, we expect to observe no relationship between farm 
size and productivity among households with privately-owned land. On the other hand, we 
may observe the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity among households 
with communally-owned land, because of the more intensive use of land by smaller land 
holders.
12
  
Hypothesis 4: We expect to observe the inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity in communities where communal land ownership prevails but not so in 
communities where private land ownership dominates. 
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 According to Larson et al. (2014), the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity has 
emerged in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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5.  Empirical strategy 
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine how migration, 
ethnic diversity, and population density affect the incidence of private land ownership. 
Specifically, we look at how the incidence of private land ownership changes as the 
proportion of immigrants and the number of tribes in a community, and the communal 
population density increase. We also use a dummy variable of whether a household is 
native or in-migrated in the analysis to identify who among the immigrants and indigenous 
households are likely to privately own land. Due to potential endogeneity concerns with 
migration variables, we instrument migrations with sleeping sickness occurrence. We 
discuss in the following sub-section why we think it is a plausible instrument.  
In the second part, we examine the determinants of different land acquisition modes, 
in particular land inheritance, purchases and renting with the expectation that land markets 
are better functioning in communities with many immigrants and densely populated 
communities. Applying community- and season-fixed effect models, we conclude the 
second part by analyzing the farm size-productivity relationship. As the hypothesis 4 
suggests, we expect to find a significant inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity in sending communities and those communities with communal land 
ownership, but a smaller or insignificant relationship in host communities and those 
communities with a higher incidence of private land ownership. 
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5.1.   Rural-to-rural migration, population density and private land ownership 
We consider an empirical specification that identifies the determinants of private 
ownership of the parcels to which our sample farm households have access. Denote parcel 
by p, household by i, and village by j. The community in our analysis is the village (LC1) 
which is the smallest administration unit in Uganda. Let      be a dummy variable that takes 
1 if parcel p is individually or privately owned by household i and 0 if it is collectively 
owned by the clan, or village or extended family. We define private ownership from the 
household responses regarding various forms of land use and transfer rights over the 
operated parcels. The parcel is privately owned if the household can sell it, give it away or 
rent it out without consulting any one. It is communally owned if the household must seek 
clan, village or extended family consent before selling, giving away or renting out the 
accessed parcel.
13
 Formally, we estimate a linear probability equation of the form: 
                                                                 
where     represents the proportion of immigrants and       is the number of tribes in 
community j;          is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the parcel owner is a native 
inhabitant in the community and 0 if he or his descendants immigrated
14
;      is the 
                                                          
13 For this analysis, we drop rented and borrowed parcels from the data set since by contractual arrangement 
the person renting or borrowing a parcel cannot transfer it. In other words, we analyze land rights status only 
for collectively or individually owned parcels. 
14
 In the survey, we captured the ethnicity of the households surveyed. We use this information to construct 
the indicator variable of whether the household is indigenous or immigrant. Historically, in Uganda specific 
kingdoms and small chiefdoms occupied different areas and regions. To date, regions are referred to by the 
kingdom they fall in or the original tribe occupying them. For instance Central region is referred to as 
Buganda because it is under the Buganda kingdom and was historically occupied by the Baganda tribe; 
western is sub-divided into Bunyoro for Banyoro tribe, Ankole for Banyankole tribe, Kigezi for Bakiga, 
among others; while near eastern is Busoga for Basoga plus many other regions. 
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population density in the community;      is a vector of parcel controls such as whether 
the parcel is on  public land or under leasehold arrangement;     is a vector of household 
characteristics, including head age, square of head age, gender of the household head, 
head’s years of schooling, squared years of schooling, family size, and the value of 
household assets (per 1000 Uganda shillings); and    is a vector of other village controls, 
e.g., whether the road to the district capital is tarmac, all-season dirt, or season dirt road 
which are expected to capture the impact of accessibility/remoteness on land tenure 
arrangements. Improved access to markets has a potential to change land tenure 
arrangements from communal to individual land ownership, as it increases the value of land. 
In terms of quality, tarmac road is best, followed by all-season dirt road and season dirt 
road. As a community variable we also include the average of the principle component one 
(PC1) collected from each sample household to capture the effect of soil quality on private 
land rights. It is possible that people may demand for private land rights to protect their 
fertile parcels.       is the idiosyncratic error term. 
The estimate   from equation (1) tells us about the relationship between the 
proportion of migrants in a community and private land ownership but may not offer us 
sufficient evidence to claim causality. This is because there might be other competing 
hypotheses: for example, better defined individual land rights may attract migrants to host 
communities, or host communities may have other attributes that attract immigrants and 
influence the demand for private land rights. On the other hand, the coefficient on         
( ) may better capture the causal relationship from migration to land ownership status than 
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the migration coefficient. If we can find that, in the same community, parcels owned by 
immigrants are more often under private ownership while those accessed by indigenous 
households are collectively owned, it could be that rural-to-rural migration influences 
changes in land tenure arrangements.  However, there still remains a concern that the 
impact of migration is underestimated, because native households in host communities may 
learn the importance of privately owning land from immigrants which will promote private 
land ownership in migrant communities.  
To address the endogeneity concerns, we exploit a natural experiment that occurred 
in eastern Uganda, in the then Iganga district which was later subdivided into Mayuge, 
Bugiri, Namayingo, Namutumba, and Luuka districts.
15
 In 1898, there was an outbreak of 
sleeping sickness in Iganga district, in Bunya County (currently Mayuge district), killing 
most of the inhabitants and displacing a few remnants (Picozzi, et al., 2005). From the 
focus group discussions, it was reported that the first phase of the sickness ended in 1910 
but the epidemic later resurfaced in the 1940s killing those people that had returned to their 
original lands. By 1956, the whole of southern Busoga (mainly Bunya) and some 
neighboring areas had been greatly affected. It is now more than 50 years since the 
epidemic was eradicated, and the affected, and the then vacant, communities have been 
settled by immigrants from many regions of Uganda. Currently the affected areas are fully 
occupied to the extent that land scarcity is one of the major concerns.  
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 In Uganda, until the population exploded in certain areas and rural-rural migration ensued, regions were 
homogenous. Iganga district is in Busoga region and was originally occupied by the Basoga. Most parts of the 
region are now ethnically diverse though with varying levels depending on the proportion of immigrants. 
Therefore, if we find a Muganda in Ankole it means either he or his ancestors immigrated to that area.  
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We use sleeping sickness occurrence as an instrument for the proportion of 
immigrants (PM) in equation (1) above. The key assumption underlying our empirical 
approach is that sleeping sickness across communities was exogenous to the land tenure 
arrangements. In other words, sleeping sickness occurrence and private land ownership are 
linked through migration. We expect to find that communities affected by sleeping sickness 
attracted many immigrants, which, in turn, led to the emergence of land tenure 
arrangements that favor private land ownership. 
5.2. Rural-to-rural migration, population density and land acquisition 
As discussed in Section 4.2, we hypothesize that land rental and sales markets are 
more active in the immigrant communities and the densely populated areas where private 
ownership is more common. To test this hypothesis, we use the information on acquisition 
modes of parcels to which farmers currently have access, and examine their relationship 
with the migration patterns and population density of the communities. There are three 
modes of land acquisition: land inheritance, renting, and purchase. We expect that land 
renting and purchase would be observed more often as the acquisition mode than 
inheritance in immigrant communities.  
We adopt an unordered multinomial logit in the analysis of land acquisition. Let A 
denote a categorical variable representing different parcel acquisition modes taking a value, 
0, 1 or 2 corresponding to inheritance, purchase, or renting, respectively. Let X denote a set 
of conditioning variables including the proportion of immigrants in the community, 
population density and other household and community controls. The probability that A 
takes m  {0,1,2} can be written as; 
19 
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The coefficients are estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
16
 The heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors are used.  
5.3. Farm size-productivity relationship by community type 
As hypothesized, we expect the private land rights to enhance efficient land 
allocation and investment. Land transactions and land investment should be higher in 
communities with a high incidence of private land ownership. In this sub-section we test 
the differences in production efficiency between communities with a high incidence of 
private land ownership and those with a higher incidence of communal land ownership by 
comparing the farm size-productivity relationship. We expect to find a more significant 
inverse relationship in sending than in receiving communities.  We run the same 
regressions separately for different community types depending on whether the community 
is receiving or sending, and whether all the household land is privately or communally 
owned. 
To test for the farm size-productivity relationship, we look at maize and bean yields, 
the widely grown cereals in Uganda. We run the community fixed effects regression using 
a two-season (the second cropping season in 2011 and the first cropping season in 2012) 
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semi-panel data set. Letting       be the yield from parcel p, belonging to household i in 
season s and community j, we run the following regression: 
                                                          
where            is the farm size in hectares of household i in season s and in community 
j.       is a vector of parcel controls such as the distance to the parcel from farmers’ 
residence (in minutes), whether the parcel is on a public or leasehold land.      is a vector 
of household controls including household head gender, age, and years of schooling, 
household assets, Thompson index (a measure of land fragmentation), and the dependence 
rate (the ratio of family members below 15 and above 65 years to the family work force; 
those between 15 and 65 years).     captures the community and season fixed effects, while 
      is an error term that may be heteroskedastic and correlated within a community and 
season. We adjust for this by using the robust standard errors and covariance matrices that 
allow for the clustering of the error terms at the community and season groups (Wooldridge, 
2010, Chapter 20). 
For comparative purposes, we run the same regression separately for the receiving 
and sending communities. We also run the same regression for households with private 
land ownership and those whose land is communally owned. 
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6. Results 
6.1. Rural-to-rural migration, population density and private land ownership 
Table 4 reports the estimation results on the determinants of private land ownership. 
The results show that there are many privately owned parcels in immigrant-dominated and 
ethnically diverse communities. Column 1 suggests that when the proportion of immigrant 
households in a community increases by 0.8 (which corresponds to the difference in the 
total proportion of immigrants between receiving and sending communities, presented in 
Table 2) the probability of a household privately owning a parcel increases by about 8% 
(which is equivalent to the regression coefficient, 0.101, multiplied by 0.8). In Column 2, 
an increase in the number of tribes in a community by 1 leads to a 0.02% increase in the 
probability of privately owning land. In column 3, we use another proxy for migration: 
whether a household or its descendants are native or indigenous in the community or 
whether they immigrated. The results show that the probability of privately owning a parcel 
is about 8% lower if the parcel-holder is a native household than if the holder is an 
immigrant. The results remain significant even when the proportion of immigrants and the 
number of tribes are included in the same specification (column 5). In all regressions we 
include the village population density as of 2003 as an explanatory variable and find no 
significant effect on private land ownership. The coefficient has a negative sign and is of 
small magnitude when migration is not controlled for (column 4). The coefficient, however, 
remains negative and becomes significant when we control for the proportion of 
immigrants in a community (columns 1, 5 and 6). We conjecture that the negative sign may 
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capture what we find in the descriptive statistics that sending communities are densely 
populated and have a high incidence of communal land ownership.  
In Section 5, we noted the concern that our results may be capturing other 
competing hypotheses, e.g., the reverse causality. However, the native household dummy 
we included in column 3 downplays this concern since native households even in host 
communities have a lower probability of privately owning land compared to immigrants. 
To further rule out the endogeneity concerns, we use sleeping sickness as an instrument for 
the proportion of immigrants in a community. The results, shown in column 6, remain 
consistent with those presented in columns 1 and 5, but the magnitude becomes larger in 
the instrumental variable (IV) specification: : increasing the proportion of immigrants in a 
community by 0.8 leads to a 46% (which is equivalent to the regression coefficient, 0.578, 
multiplied by 0.8) increase in the probability of privately owning land. The instrument 
passes all tests including the weak instrument test.  
While we do not find the positive effect of population density on private land 
ownership, the first stage regression reveals that population density leads to migration 
(column 7). This suggests that whereas we do not find a direct effect of population density 
on land tenure arrangements (column 4), it works indirectly through influencing rural-to-
rural migrations. 
 6.2. Rural-to-rural migration, population density and land acquisition 
Table 5 reports the average marginal effects computed from the multinomial log-
odd ratios. We find that immigration increases land purchases and land renting but 
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decreases land inheritance as modes of land acquisition. Column 1 suggests that a 0.8 
increase in the proportion of immigrants in a community is associated with 12% (which is 
equivalent to the regression coefficient multiplied by 0.8) lower probability of acquiring 
land through inheritance. On the other hand, increasing the proportion of immigrants in a 
community by 0.8 is associated with 6.2% (column 2) and 5.5% (column 3) significantly 
higher probability of acquiring land through purchase and renting, respectively. Although 
the signs of the coefficient are as expected, we do not find a significant effect of population 
density on any of the modes of land acquisition, again suggesting that rural-to-rural 
migration, through diluting social cohesion and weakening informal institutions, enhances 
land transactions in host communities. 
6.3. Farm size-productivity relationship by community type  
Table 6 presents the estimates of the relationship between farm size and yield. The results 
are presented by ownership type: whether the households’ parcels are privately or 
communally owned, and by community type: whether the household is in the sending or 
receiving community. Since private land ownership is more common in receiving 
communities, the results should be consistent in the two classification categories. Columns 
1 and 3 confirms hypothesis 4. We do not find the inverse relationship between farm size 
and yield in households that have privately owned land and in communities with many 
immigrants, whereas we find a strongly significant inverse relationship in households that 
own land communally and in sending communities. Doubling farm size is associated with 
19% lower yield lower yield on communally-owned land as shown in column 2 and by 
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27% in sending communities as shown in column 4. In all specifications, we include crop 
dummies, community and seasonal fixed effects.  
Table 7 presents robustness checks where we run the same specifications but define 
receiving and sending community differently. This is to address the concerns that the way 
we defined the communities may be influencing our results. So far, we defined all 
communities as receiving if more than 30% of either the current generation or the second 
generation immigrated and as sending if at most 30% of the households immigrated. We 
adjust the cutoff points to 10%, 20% and 40% and check whether our results are sensitive 
to these changes. We find that our results remain robust to these modifications. We 
consistently do not find any inverse relationship in receiving communities and find a strong 
and significant relationship in sending communities. 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this study, we used community, household and parcel data from rural Uganda to 
test the hypotheses that (1) ethnic diverse communities have a higher incidence of privately 
owned land than the homogenous communities with fewer migrants, (2) densely populated 
communities introduce private land ownership systems than sparsely populated 
communities and (3) land markets are efficient in immigrant, ethnically diverse and densely 
populated areas which reduce or remove the commonly observed inverse relationship 
between farm size and productivity. We found that land tenure systems have evolved in the 
last decade or so in Uganda.  Whereas our results confirm hypotheses 1 and 2, we do not 
find the evidence to support hypothesis 3 corresponding to the positive effect of population 
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density on private land ownership. Moreover, when we control for the proportion of 
immigrants in a community, the coefficient of population density becomes negative and 
even significant. We found, however, that population density positively and significantly 
determine out-migrations, suggesting that whereas population density does not directly 
affect the evolution of land tenure arrangements towards private land ownership, it 
indirectly affects the evolution through influencing inter- community migrations. 
We also found that the probability of renting and purchasing a parcel is higher and 
that of land inheritance is lower in the immigrant communities.  The functioning of land 
markets in turn translates into lower and insignificant inverse relationship between farm 
size and productivity in host communities. In other words, there is a significantly lower 
yield per hectare on larger-farms in non-immigrant communities (referred to as sending 
communities) while we did not find such relationship between farm size and yield in 
immigrant communities (also referred to as receiving/host communities). 
Our findings suggested inter-community migration promotes private land ownership which 
enhances land transactions. Land transactions, in turn, enhance equity, and production 
efficiency as land is transferred from less efficient large farms to more efficient small farms 
(Heltberg, 1998; Otsuka,  2007; Songqing & Jayne, 2013). However, land markets remain 
inactive if land is owned communally because of high transaction costs due to communal 
restrictions. In order to promote efficient and equitable land transactions, deliberate policies 
should be designed to transform land ownership arrangements from communal to private 
land ownership so as to improve the performance of land markets, which would in turn 
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increase production efficiency, boost agriculture performance, and reduce poverty in the 
rural areas. Nonetheless, they should be implemented with caution so that they would not 
cause land disputes and conflicts among residents. Land conflicts reduce the agricultural 
productivity significantly (Mwesigye & Matsumoto, 2013).  
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Table 1:  Changes in land tenure systems over time  
Year: 2003 2005 2013 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Proportion of parcels under:       
Private ownership 0.40 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.50 
Communal ownership 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 
Mailo tenure 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 
Leasehold/Public land 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.18 
Number of parcels per household 2.53 2.06 3.09 2.47 3.77 2.66 
Total number of parcels (Households) 2378 (940) 2859 (936) 2820 (917) 
Notes: Authors’ computation using RePEAT panel data set. 
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 Table 2:    Migration, population density and community accessibility by community type 
  Sending (S) Receiving (R) 
|S-R| 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Number of tribes 2.630 1.884 6.565 4.554 *** 
Proportion of immigrants to a community:      
             Current generation immigrants 0.097 0.087 0.522 0.249 *** 
             Parent’s generation immigrants 0.082 0.138 0.410 0.264 *** 
1 if a community was affected by sleeping sickness 0 0 0.095 0.296 *** 
Community population density in 2003 (persons/ha) 5.304 3.274 4.967 2.368 *** 
Road condition to district:      
              1 if tarmac 0.143 0.356 0.219 0.417 
               1 if all-season dirt road 0.464 0.508 0.578 0.498 *** 
              1 if seasonal dirt road 0.393 0.497 0.188 0.393 *** 
Soil quality: Principle Component 1 (PC1) 0.41 1.54 -0.57 1.00 *** 
Number of communities 28   62     
Source: Authors computation using 2012 RePEAT data . 
***, **, and * are significance levels of the t-test difference in means between the two community types at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Soli quality measure (PC1) ranges from -6 to 6. 
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Table 3:  Basic Characteristics of sample parcel and households by community type 
  Sending (S) Receiving (R) 
|S-R| 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Parcel level variables 
     Maize and Beans yield (Kilograms/ha) 1046.9 963.4 1068.4 965.2 
 Time to plot (minutes) 18.6 33.1 14.5 27.2 *** 
Tenure system 
         1 if privately owned 0.642 0.480 0.700 0.459 *** 
    1 if communally owned 0.354 0.478 0.236 0.425 *** 
    1 if leasehold/public 0.003 0.056 0.048 0.214 *** 
Acquisition mode 
         1 if inherited 0.491 0.500 0.288 0.453 *** 
    1 if purchased 0.436 0.496 0.576 0.494 ** 
    1 if rented 0.072 0.258 0.136 0.343 *** 
Number of parcels 1042 
 
1105 
  Household Level variables 
     1 if household is native/indigenous 0.85 0.36 0.60 0.49 *** 
Total farm size (hectares) 2.07 3.46 2.95 4.89 *** 
Number of parcels 4.98 3.31 3.59 2.24 *** 
1 if household is female-headed  0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 
 Household head's age 53.34 15.33 52.75 14.00 *** 
Household head's years of schooling 5.38 3.80 5.91 3.91 *** 
Family size  7.71 3.84 7.98 3.61 ** 
Dependence rate 1.19 0.92 1.21 0.88 
 Assets value (‘000 Uganda Shillings) 698.09 1002.74 1075.42 1380.22 *** 
Number of Households 262   479     
Authors computation using 2012 RePEAT data  
***, **, and * are significance levels of the t-test difference in means between the two community types at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively.  
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Table 4:  Determinants of  private land ownership 
  Dependent variable takes 1 if the parcel is privately owned 
  
IV First-Stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Proportion of total immigrants in 
a community 0.101*** 
   
0.0575** 0.578** 
 
 
(4.178) 
   
(2.271) (1.962) 
 Number of tribes in a community 
 
0.0188*** 
  
0.0167*** 
  
  
(5.829) 
  
(4.931) 
  1 if household is native 
  
-0.0825*** 
    
   
(-3.729) 
    Community population density in 
2003 (persons/ha) -0.00940* -0.00871 -0.00551 -0.00499 -0.0108** -0.0301** 0.0431*** 
 
(-1.740) (-1.643) (-1.045) (-0.938) (-2.039) (-2.099) (8.027) 
Road condition to district 
capital
a
:        
       1 if tarmac 0.122*** 0.0252 0.104*** 0.111*** 0.0410 0.175*** -0.142*** 
 
(3.479) (0.671) (2.955) (3.133) (1.076) (3.573) (-4.009) 
      1 if all-season dirt road 0.0512 0.0202 0.0471 0.0576 0.0207 0.0213 0.0534* 
 
(1.450) (0.572) (1.337) (1.624) (0.586) (0.501) (1.805) 
Soil quality measure: PC1 0.00229 0.00897 -0.00600 -0.00839 0.0131 0.0525* -0.0949*** 
 
(0.259) (0.975) (-0.682) (-0.946) (1.448) (1.696) (-11.02) 
1 if leasehold/public -0.850*** -0.853*** -0.851*** -0.861*** -0.848*** -0.796*** -0.103* 
 
(-18.58) (-19.31) (-18.67) (-18.79) (-19.20) (-12.60) (-1.753) 
1 if hh is female-headed 0.0566* 0.0537* 0.0585** 0.0587** 0.0531* 0.0466 0.0268 
 
(1.908) (1.811) (1.996) (1.981) (1.787) (1.308) (0.759) 
Head age 0.00833* 0.00775 0.00570 0.00711 0.00838* 0.0141** -0.0110** 
 
(1.759) (1.638) (1.195) (1.478) (1.779) (2.287) (-2.155) 
Head age squared -7.57e-05* -7.46e-05* -5.20e-05 -6.67e-05 -7.88e-05** -0.000118** 7.71e-05* 
 
(-1.885) (-1.845) (-1.276) (-1.626) (-1.969) (-2.374) (1.728) 
Head years of schooling 0.00787 0.00779 0.00844 0.00658 0.00839 0.0140 -0.0122 
 
(1.088) (1.063) (1.158) (0.899) (1.151) (1.621) (-1.458) 
Head years of schooling squared -0.000752 -0.000737 -0.000642 -0.000587 -0.000813 -0.00152** 0.00153*** 
 
(-1.444) (-1.383) (-1.235) (-1.125) (-1.529) (-2.144) (2.874) 
Family size -0.0110*** -0.0110*** -0.0106*** -0.0115*** -0.0108*** -0.00867** -0.00556* 
 
(-3.218) (-3.262) (-3.074) (-3.301) (-3.217) (-2.305) (-1.892) 
Log of assets value (‘000 Uganda 
SHS) 0.0449*** 0.0400*** 0.0469*** 0.0499*** 0.0382*** 0.0209 0.0477*** 
 
(4.391) (3.941) (4.559) (4.848) (3.772) (1.123) (4.455) 
1 if a community was affected by 
sleeping sickness 
      
0.223*** 
       
(6.311) 
Constant 0.0337 0.0775 0.183 0.0761 0.0533 -0.166 0.401*** 
 
(0.234) (0.546) (1.266) (0.525) (0.375) (-0.852) (2.582) 
Region dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 1,408 
R-squared 0.385 0.395 0.383 0.378 0.396 0.239 0.377 
           Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Weak identification test): 22.160  
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics computed using robust standard errors.  *** shows significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
a The reference category for tarmac and all season dirt road is season dirt road 
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Table 5:  Determinants of land acquisition mode 
Multinomial: Average Marginal effects 
 
Inherited=1 Purchased=1 Rented=1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Proportion of total immigrants in a community -0.147*** 0.0783** 0.0687*** 
 
(-4.770) (2.366) (3.121) 
Community population density in 2003 (persons/ha) -0.00614 0.00448 0.00166 
 
(-0.982) (0.709) (0.427) 
Road condition to district
a
:    
       1 if tarmac 0.122*** -0.167*** 0.0446 
 
(3.213) (-4.156) (1.644) 
       1 if all-season dirt road -0.0274 0.0100 0.0174 
 
(-0.790) (0.279) (0.736) 
Soil quality measure: PC1 -0.00391 -0.000234 0.00415 
 
(-0.371) (-0.0205) (0.550) 
1 if leasehold/public -0.0397 0.000449 0.0393 
 
(-0.435) (0.00503) (0.667) 
1 if hh is female-headed -0.0169 0.0234 -0.00654 
 
(-0.462) (0.600) (-0.249) 
Head age -0.0106* 0.00754 0.00302 
 
(-1.845) (1.184) (0.680) 
Head age squared 7.23e-05 -2.34e-05 -4.88e-05 
 
(1.449) (-0.419) (-1.188) 
Head years of schooling 0.0151 -0.0105 -0.00465 
 
(1.606) (-1.067) (-0.698) 
Head years of schooling squared -0.000773 0.000542 0.000230 
 
(-1.234) (0.832) (0.540) 
Family size -0.00614* 0.00210 0.00405** 
 
(-1.679) (0.569) (2.082) 
Log of assets value (‘000 Uganda Shs) -0.0561*** 0.0726*** -0.0165** 
 
(-4.377) (5.508) (-2.157) 
Region dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 1,579 1,579 1,579 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics computed using robust standard errors. 
 *** shows significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.   
a
 The reference category for tarmac and all season dirt road is season dirt road 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 6: Relationship between farm-size and yield by ownership type and by community type  
Dependent Variable: Log of yield 
 
Ownership type Community type 
 
Private Communal Receiving  Sending 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of farm size (ha) -0.0729 -0.191* -0.0519 -0.272** 
 
(-0.781) (-1.702) (-0.719) (-2.192) 
Time to plot (minutes) -0.00105 -0.00195 -0.00195 -0.000688 
 
(-0.886) (-0.657) (-1.526) (-0.518) 
Acquisition mode
a
:  Rented -0.0117 -0.182 -0.0528 -0.305** 
 
(-0.0852) (-0.875) (-0.406) (-2.172) 
          Inherited 0.105 0.0513 -0.0589 0.148 
 
(1.019) (0.362) (-0.573) (1.519) 
1 if household is native 0.0943 0.0382 -0.0422 0.277 
 
(0.704) (0.127) (-0.380) (0.887) 
Thompson Index 0.0460 0.251 0.0822 0.264 
 
(0.181) (0.836) (0.411) (0.673) 
1 if hh is female-headed -0.277** -0.132 -0.230* -0.311 
 
(-2.268) (-0.464) (-1.983) (-1.670) 
Head Age -0.00779* -0.00594 -0.00619 -0.00730 
 
(-1.758) (-1.068) (-1.447) (-1.562) 
Head years of schooling -0.00649 0.000269 -0.00510 -0.00104 
 
(-0.437) (0.0139) (-0.415) (-0.0734) 
Family size -0.0171 -0.0131 -0.00998 -0.0237** 
 
(-1.137) (-0.778) (-0.602) (-2.128) 
Dependence rate -0.113** -0.0492 -0.130** -0.0531 
 
(-2.188) (-0.490) (-2.577) (-0.717) 
Log of assets value (‘000 Uganda SHS) 0.142** 0.106 0.156** 0.125* 
 
(2.526) (1.164) (2.473) (1.889) 
Constant 6.079*** 5.833*** 5.906*** 5.836*** 
 
(11.36) (7.667) (12.22) (7.944) 
Community*Season FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,670 1,006 1,640 1,094 
R-squared 0.174 0.171 0.186 0.186 
Notes: In parentheses are t-statistics computed using robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at the 
community level.  *** shows significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Crop dummies are included in all 
specifications. 
a
 The reference of the  parcel acquisition mode is purchased.  
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 7: Robustness check: Relationship between farm-size and yield in communities with different immigrant 
proportions  
  Dependent Variable: Log of yield 
 
Percentage of current and past generation immigrants in a community 
 
>10% >20% >40 <10% <20% <40% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of farm size (ha) -0.0523 -0.0256 -0.0291 -0.219* -0.307** -0.250** 
 
(-0.750) (-0.379) (-0.407) (-1.774) (-2.179) (-2.509) 
Time to plot (minutes) -0.00167 -0.00169 -0.00155 -0.00109 -0.000281 -0.000862 
 
(-1.566) (-1.463) (-1.206) (-0.729) (-0.186) (-0.686) 
Acquisition mode
a
:  Rented -0.158 -0.111 -0.0506 0.143 -0.277 -0.249* 
 
(-1.487) (-0.933) (-0.362) (0.511) (-1.442) (-1.876) 
            Inherited 0.00992 0.0402 -0.0154 0.190 0.0748 0.132 
 
(0.115) (0.433) (-0.147) (1.650) (0.563) (1.285) 
Household is native -0.0184 -0.00746 -0.0444 0.680 0.256 0.211 
 
(-0.173) (-0.0668) (-0.383) (0.827) (0.575) (0.838) 
Thompson Index 0.130 0.169 0.0646 -0.298 -0.144 0.0308 
 
(0.743) (0.875) (0.314) (-0.626) (-0.423) (0.120) 
1 if hh is female-headed -0.183* -0.223** -0.226** -0.625** -0.343 -0.323 
 
(-1.843) (-2.137) (-2.014) (-2.774) (-1.428) (-1.707) 
Head Age -0.00693* -0.00636 -0.00592 -0.00930* -0.00827* -0.00850* 
 
(-1.945) (-1.614) (-1.402) (-2.227) (-1.788) (-1.888) 
Head years of schooling -0.00359 -0.00834 -0.00814 -0.0350 -0.00421 -3.41e-05 
 
(-0.354) (-0.742) (-0.663) (-1.795) (-0.268) (-0.00240) 
Family size -0.0241* -0.0262* -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0122 -0.0259** 
 
(-1.921) (-1.928) (-0.775) (-1.307) (-0.776) (-2.352) 
Dependence rate -0.0873* -0.0993** -0.128** -0.178 -0.125 -0.0819 
 
(-1.984) (-2.104) (-2.474) (-1.331) (-1.208) (-1.081) 
Log of assets value (‘000 Uganda 
SHS) 0.130** 0.143** 0.178*** 0.0916 0.0942 0.0719 
 
(2.618) (2.641) (2.904) (0.656) (1.063) (1.123) 
Constant 6.115*** 5.991*** 5.771*** 6.430*** 6.426*** 6.451*** 
 
(14.96) (13.98) (12.34) (6.490) (7.915) (12.01) 
Community*Season FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,242 1,940 1,620 422 724 1,044 
R-squared 0.190 0.205 0.179 0.212 0.168 0.232 
Notes: In parentheses are t-statistics computed using robust standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at the community level.  
*** shows significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.  Crop dummies are included in all specifications. 
a
 The reference for parcel acquisition modes: rented and inherited  is purchased.  
 
 
